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GROWING IMPORTANCE
OF THE SERVICE INDUSTRIES
"Theeconomics of tertiary industry," wrote
Cohn Clark in 1940, "remains to be written.
Many, as yet, feel uncomfortable about even
admitting their existence." In the last twenty-
five years, pioneering studies at the National
Bureau by Friedman and Kuznets, Fabricant,
Barger, Stigler, Kendrick, and others have
P A R T II done much to change that picture. Our present
research, begun in the summer of 1963 with
the aid of a three-year grant from the Ford
R
Foundation,is an effort to build on this earlier eporS Ofl workand to extend our knowledge of the
service sector—defined for this study to in- Selected eludetrade, finance, insurance and real estate,
personal, professional, business, and repair
Bureau services,and general government. In particu-
lar, we are attempting to measure and analyze
Programs output,input, and productivity in these in-
dustries.
Our work has been organized along three
major lines. First, we have undertaken studies
of individual industries, such as retail trade,
state and local government, personal services,
and health. Second, we have planned studies
designed to shed light on problems that cut
across all or most of the service industries—
problems such as changes in skill mix, changes
in hours, and the role of the consumer in the
production process. Finally, we are attempting
to view the sector as a whole and to contrast
it with the rest of the economy.
This last is not to posit some bland homo-
geneity for all the service industries, or to
deny the existence of conflicting trends within
the sector. David Schwartzman's study of re-
tailing, for instance, indicates that productivity
gains have varied widely from one store type
to another, and Jean Wilburn has shown that
even two such apparently similar industries
as barber shops and beauty parlors can behave
5very differently with respect to productivity.
We are aware of many intrasector differences
and intend to discuss them in various parts of
the project.
In addition to such differences, however,
we find that the service sector differs signifi-
cantly from the rest of the economy in a
number of important ways. Some of these
intersector differences are discussed in Produc-
tivity Trends in the Goods and Service Sectors,
1929-61. A Preliminary Survey, Occasional
Paper No. 89, published last October. Others
will be developed in a second paper, "The
Growing Importance of the Service Sector,"
which is now in preparation. My purpose here
is to report a few tentative conclusions con-
cerning the growth of services and to indicate
some implications of this growth for the econ-
omy and for economic analysis.
1. THE GROWTH OF SERVICES
I begin with the observation that all of the
net growth of employment in the United States
in the postwar period has occurred in the
service sector. As a result, this sector now
accounts for more than half of total employ-
ment and more than half of gross national
product. The U.S. is now a "service economy"
—i.e., we are the first nation in the history
of the world in which more than half of the
employed population is not involved in the
production of food, clothing, houses, auto-
mobiles, and other tangible goods.1
Although the shift of employment to the
service industries has been particularly dra-
matic in the postwar period, it was also in
evidence prior to the war, as may be seen in
Table 11-1 and Chart TI-i.
In addition to sector comparisons, Table TI-i
presents data by industry group in explicit
recognition of the partly arbitrary character of
the sector definitions. These definitions arise
in part from our interest in a group of indus-
tries that have not received much attention in
1One dramatic example of this shift is that the
increase in employment in education between 1950
and 1960 was greater than the total employment in
primary metal industries in either year.
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the past from economists concerned with
productivity analysis. The boundary between
service and goods production is very difficult
to draw, and probably no division based on
industrial classifications would be completely
satisfactory. In practice, however, the basic
point concerning the growing relative impor-
tance of services would be unaffected by any
reasonable changes in definition.
Not only is there a significant difference
between sector aggregates, but most individual
service industries grew rapidly while most
goods industries grew slowly. One-third of the
goods industries experienced an absolute de-
cline in employment between 1929 and 1963.
If a service and a goods industry are chosen
at random, the odds are greater than two to
one that employment in the service industry
will have grown faster. If we look at "service
type"occupations compared with"goods
type" occupations, thedifferentialrateof
growth is even greater than when the basis
of classification is the industry, because serv-
ice-type occupations have grown relatively,
even within goods industries.
This shift of employment to services did
not start in 1929. For as long as we have rec-
ords on theindustrialdistribution of the
employed population, we find a secular ten-
dency for the percentage accounted for by
the service sector to rise. Between 1870 and
1930 the differential in rates of growth aver-
aged 1.4 per cent per annum. Since 1929 the
average differential has been 1.7 per cent per
annum. Between 1870 and 1920, the shift
could be explained entirely by the relative
decline of agriculture. Since 1920, however,
the nonagricultural goods sector has not grown
as rapidly as services, and in the last decade
has not had any employment growth at all.
This pervasive and persistent trend has gen-
erally been attributed to sector differences in
income elasticity of demand and productivity.
Neither explanation can be tested precisely
because accurate measures of real output are
not available for many service (and some
goods) industries. By making reasonable alter-
native assumptions about sector differentials
in rates of growth of real output, however, weTABLE Il-i
PERSONS ENGAGED BY SECTOR AND MAJOR INDUSTRY
(thousands)
GROUP, SELECTED YEARS, 1929-63
1929 1937 1948 1953 1957 1963
Goods 27,561 25,989 31,764 33,286 32,767 31,445
Service 18,655 21,167 26,812 31,779 33,807 37,962
Agriculture, forestry, and
fishing 9,205 8,864 7,012 5,885 5,470 4,725
Mining 1,017 993 1,021 896 858 654
Construction 2,306 1,738 3,262 3,801 4,161 4,305
Manufacturing 10,556 10,686 15,468 17,462 17,054 16,767
Transportation 3,034 2,333 3,000 2,997 2,846 2,546
Communications and
public utilities 1,034 901 1,281 1,403 1,514 1,461
Government enterprise 409 474 720 842 864 987
Wholesale trade 1,744 1,857 2,712 2,971 3,205 3,391
Retail trade 6,077 6,305 8,597 9,311 9,775 10,537
Finance and insurance 1,207 1,065 1,349 1,705 2,040 2,437
Real estate 368 455 574 615 681 763
Households and institutions 3,249 3,060 3,051 3,246 3,749 4,316
Professional, personal,
business, and repair
services 3,235 3,369 4,449 4,780 5,303 6,182
General government
(including armed forces) 2,775 5,056 6,080 9,151 9,054 10,336
SOURCE: Office of Business Economics, Survey
1958; National Income, 1954 Edition.
of Current Business,July1964; U.S. income and Output,
NOTE
Goods =Agriculture,mining, construction, manufacturing, transportation, communications and public utilities,
and government enterprise.
ServiceWholesale and retailtrade; finance, insurance, and real estate; services; and general government.
have formed some judgments concerning the
relative importance of different explanatory
factors for the period 1929-63.
1. The income elasticity of demand may
have been slightly higher for services than for
goods (but not higher than for goods exclud-
ing agriculture), but itis very unlikely that
this was a major cause of the shift in employ-
ment. Sector differences in the rate of growth
of real output were probably very small; dif-
ferences in the rate of growth of real output
per man were probably very large.
2. The differential in the rate of growth of
real output per man probably reflects a mod-
erate differential change in productivity in the
sense of efficiency in the use of resources, but
this is not the only or major explanation. It
also reflects a more rapid decline in hours per
man in services, a more rapid risein the
quality of labor in goods, and a more rapid
rise in capital per worker in goods.
The slow growth of quality of labor and
physical capital per worker can be observed
in most individual service industries. An in-
teresting instance isstate and local govern-
ment, where Ernest Kurnow finds that there
has been no increase in capital per worker
since 1929, and little change in labor skill mix.
7CHART U-I
Employment, Goods and Service Sectors,
1929-40, 1946-63
SouRcE: U.S. Department of Commerce,
Office of Business Economics.
NOTE: See Table Il-I for sector definitions.
The observed differential change in capital
intensity and quality of labor are in the same
direction as the differential in technological
change and may be complementary toit.
Alternatively,they may be a responseto
changes in relative factor prices. Since 1929
the price of labor has tended to rise relative to
the price of capital, and the price of unskilled
labor has risen relative to the price of skilled
labor. Such changes would have tended to
alter sector employment shares because the
distribution of factors was not the same in the
two sectors in the initial period. Moreover,
these trends were probably stronger inthe
8
goods sector than in the service sector because
of the growth of unions in goods but not in
services, and because many of the service in-
dustries were exempt from minimum-wage
legislation.
We plan to undertake work this summer
on the elasticity of substitution between skilled
labor and unskilled labor and on income elas-
ticity of demand in order to gain some insight
into these questions.
2. SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR
THE ECONOMY
'60'63 The shift from primary to secondary produc-
tion has had profound consequences for every
industrial nation; the shift of employment to
services may also have significant implications
for the economy.
To be sure, such an attempt to look into
the future is subject to important qualifica-
tions. A shift in the relative importance of
differentindustriesisonly oneof many
changes that are occurring simultaneously in
the economy, and these other changes may
tend to offset the effects of interindustry shifts.
Also, these shifts themselves may set in motion
changes with implications different from those
discussed here. Nevertheless, given the rapid
growth of the service industries,itis useful
to consider some of the differences between
them and the rest of the economy.
LABOR
Severalimportant sector differences in labor
force characteristics are summarized in Table
11-2. Probably the most significant difference
is that many occupations in the service sector
do not make special demands for physical
strength. This means that women can com-
pete on more nearly equal terms with men,
and we find females holding down almost
one-half of allservice jobs compared with
only one-fifth of those in the goods sector. We
also find proportionately more older workers
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1929 '35 '40 '45 '50 '55
Per cent Shore of Total EmploymentTABLE 11-2
LABOR FORCE CHARACTERISTICS, GOODS AND SERVICE SECTORS, 1960
NOTE: For sector definitions see note to Table Il-i.
a Data in this table for civilian employment only.
rapidly growing sector would tend to have a
younger work force.
An additional reason women and older
workers are attracted to the service sector is
that it provides greater opportunities for part-
time employment. Trade and services, in par-
ticular, have employed large numbers of part-
timers, and the number has grown appreciably
in the postwar period. If data were available
on those working part-time voluntarily, the
difference between the sectors would probably
be even greater than that shown in Table 11-2.
The situation with respect to self-employ-
ment iscomplex. According tothe1960
Census of Population, the two sectors have
approximately equal numbers of self-employed.
Agriculture accounts for the lion's share (63
per cent) of the goods sector, while self-em-
ployment opportunities in services are wide-
spread throughout the sector, with the excep-
tion of government and nonprofit institutions.
The Census of Population undoubtedly under-
states the number of self-employed in services
relative to goods, because corporate employees
are classified as wage and salary workers, re-
gardless of the size of the corporation. The
officers of small, owner-managed corporations
are, for analytical purposes, similar to part-
ners or individual proprietors. About three-
quarters of such corporations are in the service
industries.
It is widely believed that opportunities for
self-employment are diminishing in the United
States, but if one excludes the decline of agri-
culture, this is no longer true. In recent years,
due largely to the growth of services, the self-
employed have grown absolutely and have
been a constant fraction of total nonagricul-
tural employment.2
The role of self-employment in the future
willbe determined by severalconflicting
2See Special Labor Force Report No. 27, "Self-
Employment in the United States, 1948-62," John E.
Bregger, U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor












1. All employeda 50 50 100 100
2.Females 29 71 19 46
3.Over6S 41 59 4 5
4.Part-timers 41 59 19 27
5.Self-employed 50 50 13 13
6.Union members 85 15 48 7
7.More than 12 years of school







SOURCE: Rows 1-5, U.S. Census of Population, 1960; Row 6, H. G.
Relative Wages in the United States, Chicago, 1963, p. 251; Rows 7, 8,
lation, 1960, 1/1000 sample.
Lewis, Unionism and
U.S. Census of Popu-trends. A continued shift to service industry
employment will tend to favor self-employ-
ment, but this may be offset by the influx of
young workers and women intothe labor
force, since these groups are predominantly
wage and salary workers. There may also be
some tendency toward larger firms within
each individual industry, but thereislittle
reason to think that the door to self-employ-
ment will be closed as long as services con-
tinue to grow.
Given the importance of females, part-time
employment, and self-employment in the serv-
ice sector, itis not surprising to find a vast
difference in the importance of unions in the
two sectors. The continued growth of services
may mean a decline in union influence in the
United States.3
The last two rows of Table 11-2 reveal inter-
esting sector differences in education. The
service industries make much greater use of
workers with higher education, and make rela-
tivelylessuse of those with only limited
schooling. This is not true for all service indus-
tries, of course, but it is true for the sector on
average
Thereisanother implication concerning
labor which is not readily apparent in the
statistics but which is potentially of consider-
able importance. For many decades we have
been hearing that industrialization has alien-
ated the worker from his work, that the
individual has no contact with the final fruit
of his labor, and that the transfer from a craft
society to one of mass production has resulted
in depersonalization and the loss of ancient
skills and virtues.
Whatever validitysuch statements may
have had in the past, a question arises whether
they now accord with reality. The advent of
a service economy may imply a reversal of
these trends. Employees in many service in-
Leo Troy's NBER paper, Trade Union Mem-
bership, 1897-1962, in press.
4The higher level of education of service industry
employees should not be confused with the fact that
changes in the level of education have been greater
in the goods sector.
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dustries are closely related to their work and
often render a highly personalizedservice
offering ample scope for the development and
exercise of personal skills.
This is true of some goods-producing occu-
pations as well, but there is little doubt that
direct confrontation of consumer and worker
occurs more frequently inservices. Within
each service industry there is some tendency
for work to become less personalized (e.g.,
teaching machines in education, self-service
counters in retailing, and laboratory tests in
medicine), but with more and more people
becoming engaged in service occupations the
net effect for the labor force as a whole may be
in the direction of the personalization of work.
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
The shift of employment to the service sector
carries with it important implications for in-
dustrial organizationinthe United States
because the size of the "firm" and the nature
of ownership and control are typically differ-
ent in the two sectors.
In goods, with some notable exceptions,
such as agriculture and construction, most of
the output is accounted for by large profit-
seeking corporations. Ownership is frequently
separate from management, and significant
market power held by a few firms in each
industry is not uncommon. In the service sec-
tor, on the other hand, and again with some
exceptions, firms are typically small, usually
owner-managed, and often noncorporate. Fur-
thermore, nonprofit operations both public
and privateaccount forone-third of the
sector's employment.
In wholesale trade, retail trade, and selected
services, accounting for more than 50 per cent
of the service sector, half of the employment
isincompanies withfewer than twenty
workers. In finance, insurance, and real estate,
40 per cent is in very small firms. Another
large fraction of service sector employment is
accounted for by self-employed professionals
and domestic servants, representing the ex-treme in small size of employer. Even govern-
ment includes many small employers. One-half
of local government employment (comprising
more than one-quarter of all civilian govern-
ment employment) isin governmental units
with fewer than 500 employees.
One statistic that epitomizes some of the
trends discussed is the percentage of the na-
tional income originating in business corpora-
tions. Ever sincethe development of the
private corporation, its role in the economy
has tended to grow, but its relative importance
apparently reached a peak in 1955, when
corporations accounted for 55.8 per cent of
total national income. Since then there has
been a tendency for this fraction to decline,
and in 1963 it was 53.8 per cent, approxi-
mately the same as in 1948.
Other things being equal, the shift to serv-
ices tends to increase the relative importance
of small firms in the economy. There are, how-
ever, forces within many industries that tend
to increase the size of the average "firm." The
pressure for consolidation of school districts
and other local government units is a notable
example. Bank mergers is another. The net
effect of these countertendencies is difficult to
predict.
Industries in which small firms account for
the bulk of the output typically do not present
industrial control problems of the "trust-bust-
ing" variety. On the other hand, there may be
more need to guard against possible restrictive
practices of trade associations and profes-
sional organizations. Small firms pose another
problem for the economy because they may
not allocate sufficient resources to research
and other activities with large external benefits.
The growing importance of the nonprofit
sector will probably raise some disturbing
questions about how to promote efficiency and
equity in such organizations. (Cf. the prob-
lems with Blue Cross.) When nonprofit oper-
ations represent only a minor exception to an
essentiallyprivate-enterpriseeconomy,the
problem is not very serious; but if we ever
reach the stage where nonprofit operations
tend to dominate the economy, we probably
will be faced with the need for radically new
instruments of regulation and control.
DEMAND FOR CAPITAL GOODS
There are some portions of the service sector
that use large quantities of physical capital.
Real estate and the services provided by gov-
ernment roads and highwaysarenotable
examples. By and large, however, goods gin-
dustries tend to be more capital intensive
than services. In recent years (1960 through
1963) expenditures for new plant and equip-
ment in goods industries were approximately
three times as great as in profit-seeking serv-
ice industries; the comparable ratio of output
levels in the two groups of industries only
1.25 to1.00. Corporate plus noncorporate
depreciation charges as a percentage of in-
dustry gross product reveal a two-to-one ratio
in favor of the goods sector, and balance-sheet
data from the Statistics of Income also suggest
that capital intensity in the goods sector is
roughly double that of the service sector.
In pointing out the relatively lower capital
intensity of most service industries, I am not
attempting to revive a "stagnation" theory in
any form. The maintenance of high levels of
employment and a rapid rate of growth are
logically consistent with a decline in the rela-
tive importance of physical capitalin the
economy. The important point is to recognize
that if such a decline occurs because of inter-
industry shifts, it may be a proper and useful
adjustment to new circumstances, with impor-
tant implications forrelativeprofitlevels.
While the national rate of savings may be just
as high as before, other forms of investment,
such as education, that are not customarily
included in savings-investment estimates may
take on increased importance.5
CYCLICAL FLUCTUATIONS
The greater stability of service industries com-
pared with goods has been observed by Daniel
Creamer inhis study of Personal Income
5Cf. F. Thomas Juster, "Trends in Consumer In-
vestment and Consumer Credit, 1897-1962," NBER
proposed Occasional Paper, in preparation.
11TABLE 11-3
UNEMPLOYMENT RATES OF WAGE AND SALARY WORKERS BY
SECTOR AND INDUSTRY GROUP, 1948-63
Average
1948-631948 1949 1950 1951 1952
(1)Goods 5.8 3.9 7.3 6.1 3.4 3.0
(2)Service 3.8 3.4 4.6 4.6 2.9 2.4
(3)Goods excluding agriculture 5.7 3.8 7.4 5.9 3.4 3.0
(4)Service excluding public administration 4.3 3.7 5.1 5.1 3.2 2.8
(5)Agriculture 7.0 4.7 6.5 8.2 3.9 3.9
(6)Mining, forestry, and fisheries 7.6 2.9 8.5 6.6 3.8 3.4
(7)Construction 10.1 7.6 11.9 10.7 6.0 5.5
(8)Manufacturing 5.3 3.5 7.2 5.6 3.3 2.8
(9) Durable goods 5.3 3.4 7.4 5.2 2.6 2.4
(10)Nondurable goods 5.3 3.6 6.9 6.0 4.0 3.3
(11)Transportation and public utilities 3.7 3.0 5.2 4.1 1.9 1.9
(12)Wholesale and retail trade 5.1 4.3 5.8 5.8 3.7 3.1
(13)Finance, insurance, and real estate 2.1 1.6 1.8 2.0 1.3 1.5
(14)Service industries 3.9 3.5 5.1 5.0 3.1 2.6
(15)Public administration 2.1 2.0 2.9 2.8 1.6 1.1
during Business Cycles, (Princeton University
Press for NBER, 1956), and by Geoffrey
Moore in an unpublished study of fluctuations
in employment during four postwar (1945-
61) business cycles. Evidence of the greater
stability of services can also be found in un-
employment rates of wage and salary workers.
Table 11-3 presents the average rate by sector
and industry group annually for 1948-63, and
the average rate for the sixteen years.
We see that unemployment in goods has
been consistently higher than in the service
sector; the average rates over the period were
6.0 and 3.8 per cent respectively. Much of
this differential can probably be explained by
a greater amount of seasonal unemployment
in goods-producing industries. The Bureau of
Labor Statistics estimated that in 1957 the
unemploymentratesforseasonalreasons
12
alone were as follows:agriculture 2.7 per
cent, construction 4.2 per cent, manufactur-
ing 1.5 per cent, and transportation .8 per cent,
whereas in trade the rate was .6 per cent and
in other private services only .3 per cent.
Of greater interest in the present context
than the difference in level is the fact that
unemployment in goods is more sensitive to
business conditions, as may be seen in Chart
11-2. The rate for each sector in each year
has been plotted as an index number with the
sector's average rate 1948-63 equal to 100.
We note that the index for goods fluctuates
more sharply than for services over the busi-
ness cycle.
The larger cyclical amplitude of unemploy-
ment ingoods presumablyreflectslarger
swings in output. One of the reasons for the
stability of output in services is the fact thatTABLE 11-3 (concluded)
the output cannot be stored. This sector, there-
fore, is spared the effects of swings in inven-
tory investment, swings which make a major
contribution to the cyclical fluctuations of the
econonly. Similarly, some service industries
do not experience cyclical changes in demand
comparable to the fluctuations in consumer or
producer demand for durable goods. We find
that cyclical swings of unemployment in non-
durable goods manufacturing industries are
less marked than in durable goods manufac-
turing; they are not as stable, however, as in
services even with government excluded.
It isdifficult to obtain accurate data on
cyclical swings in service industry output as
distinct from employment, but in my judgment
the amplitude of fluctuation in output is almost
certainly greater than that of employment.
Thus, inferences about stability, based on
employment data, should be tempered in dis-
cussing output swings.
Reasons for the discrepancy stem from the
nature of the labor force in services. First,
there are large numbers of self-employed;
their employment is almost completely insen-
sitive to cyclical fluctuation in output. Second,
the role of salaried employees, as opposed to
hourly workers, is much larger in services than
it is in goods. Also, the educational level is
higher and the costs of hiring are probably
greater. This means that dismissals or layoffs
during recessions that are expected to be
short-lived will be less frequent. Finally,it
should be noted that there is a substantial
number of service industry employees classi-
fied as "wage and salary workers" who are
actually compensated on a "piecework" basis.
Their wages, in whole or in part, are deter-
mined by their output, and take the form of
commissions, tips, or a share of "profits."
Employers have little reason to fire such em-
ployees when business fallsoff. This group
13





















































































































































































SOURCE: TtIanpower Report of the President,Washington, 1964, Table A-li.CHART 11-2
Annual Indexes of Unemployment Rates,
Goods and Service Sectors, Relative to












NOTE:SeeTable 11-1 for sector definitions.
best of my knowledge, this point is neglected
in the analysis of productivity in goods-pro-
ducing industries, as well it might be. After
all, productivity in the automobile industry is
not affected by whether the ultimate drivers
are bright or stupid, or whether they drive
carefully or carelessly.
In services, however, the consumer fre-
quently plays an important role in production.
Sometimes, as in the barber's chair, the role is
essentially passive. In such cases the only
conceptual adjustment called for is to recog-
nize that the time of the consumer is also a
100 scarceresource. But in the supermarket the
consumer actually works, and in the doctor's
80 — officethe quality of the medical history the
patient gives may influence significantly the
60 - productivityof the doctor. Productivity in
banking is affected by whether the clerk or
40- - thecustomer makes out the deposit slip—and
whether it is made out correctly or not. This,
in turn, is likely to be a function of the edu-
1948 '51 '54 '57 '60 '63 cationof the customer, among other factors.
Productivity in education, as every teacher
knows,isdetermined largely by what the
student contributes, and, to take an extreme
case, the performance of a string quartet can
be affected by the audience's response. Thus,
we see that productivity in many service in-
dustries is dependent in part on the knowl-
edge, experience, and motivation of the con-
sumer. Consider, for instance, what would
happen to service industry productivity in the
United States if technology and capital and
labor inputs remained as they are, but the
consumers were exchanged for 190 million
consumers chosen at random from India.
In a similar vein, productivity can be and
often is affected by the level of honesty of the
consumer. if consumers can be trusted to
refrain from stealing merchandise, to report
prices and costs properly at check-out coun-
ters, to honor verbal commitments for pur-
chases and other contracts, and so on, there
can be tremendous savings in personnel on
the part of producers of services. These savings
are probably important when comparisons are
made with productivity in other countries or
with the same country at different points in
includes real estate, insurance and security
brokers, waiters and waitresses, barbers and
beauticians, and most salesmen of durable
goods. Because their earnings are more sensi-
tive to cyclical fluctuations in spending than
are their hours of work, we can think of these
workers as having "flexible wages."6
3. IMPLICATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
One lesson that our study of productivity in
the service industries keeps forcing upon us is
the importance of the consumer as a cooperat-
ing agent in the production process. To the
61 am grateful to Jacob Mincer for this formu-
lation.
14time. It may be that qualities such as honesty
are themselves functions of the general level
of productivity and income. A full analysis
of productivity, therefore, requires considera-
tion of these interrelations. We expect to begin
work soon on the role of the consumer in
production.
Another area where the growth of services
may require some refinement of concepts is
in the analysis of the relation between changes
in demand and changes in productivity. In
many service industriesitis not enough to
know by how much demand has changed in
order to predict the effect on productivity. At
least two other dimensions of demand in
addition to quantity must be specified.
One source of variation arises because out-
put is frequently uneven, with peaks coming
at particular hours of the day, particular days
in the week, and even particular weeks in the
month. During nonpeak times there is usually
idle capacity. An increase in demand, ifit
occurs at these times, may result in very sub-
stantial gains in productivity. On the other
hand, an increase in demand, ifit occurs at
times of peak demand, will probably not result
in much or any increase in productivity.
A second source of variation is the "size of
transaction," which has received some atten-
tion with respect to goods production (espe-
cially in articles by Armen Alchian and Jack
Hirshleifer), but which seems to be of special
importance in many service industries, such as
retailing, banking, and insurance. We hope to
explore this question in greater detail next
year.
My final example of how the growth of
services may affect economic analysis con-
cerns the gross national product in constant
dollars. This statistic is the keystone of many
studies of productivity and economic growth.
Unfortunately,itprobablyis becoming in-
creasingly less useful for such purposes. The
reason is very simple. Measures of real out-
put in the service sector have always been
unsatisfactory; as this sector becomes more
important, the aggregate measure must be-
come less satisfactory in the absence of signif-
icant improvements in the measures for in-
dividual industries.
Another trend working in the same direc-
tionisthe decrease in market labor asa
fractionofalltime spentinproductive
activity. A small increase in the fraction of
the adult population in the labor force has
been more than offset by decreases in average
hours per week and increases in vacations and
holidays. Some of the increased free time may
be spent in pure leisure, but probably the
bulk of it is spent in the nonmarket production
of goods and services and in consumer par-
ticipation in the market production of services.
As I have already suggested, how well or
poorly these activities are carried out will
surely influence economic well-being. Further-
more, both the output and inputs involved
should be includedinany comprehensive
measure of productivity.
Economists have long been aware that the
value of real GNP as a measure of econ9mic
well-being differs depending upon the level of
economic development. There has been a pre-
sumption that the measure becomes more
useful the more highly developed the economy
is.7
Up to a point it is probably true that the
higher the real GNP is, the more reliable it is
as a measure of economic welfare. But the
trend may now be in the other direction be-
cause at high levels of GNP per capita a
large fraction of productivity effort will be
devoted to services (where output is very
difficult to measure) and to other activities
that are presently not measured at all.
One aspect of the problem emerges from my
study of mortality (undertaken because of
our interest in the productivity of the health
industry). At low and moderate levels of
economic development, there is usually a neg-
ative correlation between real GNP per capita
7Cf. Simon Kuznets, "the importance of domestic
activities relative to those that are part of the busi-
ness system declinesinthe long run." National
Incomeand ItsCo,nposition, 1919-1938, New York,
NBER, 1941, p. 432.
15and death rates. Now we have a situation
where U.S. GNP per capita is 50percent
above the Swedish level, but life expectancy
is considerably lower in the U.S., and the
death rate for males 50-54is double the
Swedish rate. The reasons for this huge dif-
ference are not known, but are probably re-
lated to the pace of work, diet, exercise, as
well as to the productivity of the health in-
dustry.
I conclude that even as we increase our
efforts to measure real output in the service
sector, we must recognize that these efforts
are likely to leave considerable margins of
uncertainty. Future studies of growth and
productivity will probably findit necessary
to develop auxiliary measures of economic
welfare and "output" to be used in conjunc-
tion with the gross national product.
VICTOR R. FUCHS
ON THE ACCURACY AND PROPERTIES OF
SHORT-TERM ECONOMIC FORECASTS
Measure whatis measurable and make measurable
whatis not measurable.—GAULE0GALILEI
Discontentis the first step in progress.—OscARWILDE
Forecasts of economic conditions aim at mag-
nitudes that are exceedingly difficult to meas-
ure or even to define, such as the nation's
aggregate output. They also often involve
factors of presumed importance which are
very elusive, such as the state of "business
confidence." When measurement isdifficult
and estimates are subject to substantial errors,
prediction can be particularly hazardous. Im-
pressed also by the complexity of economic
processes and the pervasiveness of chance,
some would indeed question the very "pre-
dictability" of the course of economic events.
This, however, misses the real point, which is
that predictability is a matter of degree, and
that the problem of the forecaster is to seek
ways to exploit most effectively all the perti-
nent information available. Since this precept
is easy to recognize but hard to implement,
forecasters can ill afford to be perfectionists;
however, in general they ought to be, and one
suspects usually are, discontented with their
products. If combined with a belief that it is
to improve forecasting methods and
results, the discontent is meaningful and po-
tentially productive.Itcalls for systematic
appraisals of the forecasts, which alone may
16
lead to lasting improvements through a proc-
ess of learning from past errors.
The need for a comprehensive and objective
review of the record of their performance
appears, in fact, to be generally recognized
by economic forecasters of all persuasions.
When the National Bureau, with the aid of a
grant from several industrial companies, in-
itiated research designed to result in such a
review, it received excellent cooperation from
sources of the forecasts that were to be com-
piled and analyzed. Work began in July 1963.
1. BACKGROUND AND SCOPE
OF THE PROJECT
The primary purpose of the National Bureau
study is to assess the accuracy of short-term
forecasts of aggregate economic activity in the
United States. This is a broad but separable
category of forecasts, in which there is much
general interest and which had a large share
in the recent expansion of the volume and
variety of economic forecasting. The restric-
tion to "short term" means that the forecasts
analyzed refer to the next year or two, or a
sequence of a few shorter periods, e.g., fouror six quarters. "Aggregate economic activity"
refers to several different variables, all com-
prehensive in scope, such as the gross national
product (GNP) and its major components,
or the index of industrial production. Fore-
casts of events of special significance to the
nation's economic fortunes, such as the major
turning points in general business conditions,
are also included. The final restriction is to
authentic forecasts from reputable sources,
published or unpublished, but in any case
recorded before the event. The sources in-
clude individuals and small or large groups
from each of three spheres that are important
in generating forecasts: business, academic in-
stitutions, and government. Except for the
turning-point predictions, the analysis has so
far covered only forecasts stated in specific
numerical terms.
In what follows, I shall report briefly on
the organization of the project as a whole and
at some length on that phase of it for which
I am primarily responsible. But, before going
into particulars, it is well to recall the general
questions that were formulated at the very
start of the research venture. Assuming we
could assemble a sufficiently large and varied
collection of authentic forecasts, and develop
an adequate methodology of forecast evalua-
tion, the following are the main substantive
problems we chose to explore: How good have
the forecasts been? What are the comparative
merits and shortcomings of the different as-
sumptions, techniques, and models used? To
what extent and in what sense are the fore-
cast errors systematic rather than random?
What improvements are feasible to make for
better and more dependable forecasts?
2. WORK IN PROGRESS
Two parts of the project are concerned mainly
with the accuracy analysis of numerical fore-
casts. One, under my direction, deals with
forecasts made without a formal specification
of the underlying model or method. The other,
carried on by Jon Cunnyngham, covers fore-
casts which have an explicit basis in econo-
metric models, i.e.,in sets of mathematical
equations designed to represent the interrela-
tions among economic variablesoperating
over time.
The accuracy analysis results in a quantita-
tive description of forecasting errors—their
magnitudes, types, and structure. The problem
is how to measure and evaluate the errors in
ways that lead to meaningful inferences about
the dependability and usefulness of the fore-
casts. Jacob Mincer's recent work on methods
of forecast evaluation furthered the progress
of this phase of the study.
One important factor in the forecasting
process is the quality of the data inputs. Ro-
sanne Cole is engaged in a study of the charac-
teristics and effects of data revisions (with
particular reference to GNP accounts), in
addition to supervising most ofthe data
processing for the project.
Rendigs Fels has been studying forecasters'
ability to recognize turning points in the busi-
ness cycle. His materials include largely quali-
tative forecasts, which are often difficult to
interpret and evaluate because of vagueness
or hedging.
Geoffrey H. Moore and Julius Shiskin have
conducted research in another phase of the
forecasting study, dealing with improvements
in the selection and classification of business
cycle indicators. They have also investigated
the properties and uses of diffusion indexes
with different spans.
The rest of this report will concentrate on
the aggregative forecasts I have been studying.
The reports of my colleagues (see Part IV)
provide information on progress in the other
areas of the project.
3. A SCORECARD FOR
FORECAST EVALUATION
Most economic forecasts are annual and have
a seasonal pattern, with a peak at year-end
when predictions are made for the following
calendar year. These periodic flurries of specu-
lation about the future generate considerable































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.try and without, among its customers and
observers, but the interest in the products of
all thisactivity typically fades away soon.
Yet forecasts, to be more useful, should be
treated as a crop planted at the opening of
the predictive "season" (here a year) and
harvested after its close, when the actual mag-
nitudes in question can be estimated and com-
pared with theforecasts,thuspermitting
appraisal of them.
In Table 11-4, this treatment is applied to
eight sets of forecasts of GNP for the period
1953-63. There isa column for each year
covered, which starts at the top with a figure
representing the "actual" level of GNP (line
1,cols. Underneath that value are
listed the deviations from it of the predictions
of GNP for the given year, that is, the forecast
level minus actual level(lines 2-9). Below
these,averagesoftheindividual forecast
errors are shown, with and without regard to
sign (lines 10-11). This arrangement enables
us to compare the forecasters' performance in
and between any of the years. This is instruc-
tive because the state and the prospects of the
economy vary from one year to another under
the impact of both economic and other changes
and disturbances, so thatforecastersface
different problems and difficulties at different
times. Furthermore, forecasters communicate
with one another, and the result of this com-
munication may show up in the similarity of
the errors they make.
The figures at the right end of the table
summarize the record of each forecast set
over the entire period covered; again, aver-
ages of the forecast errors are given here with
and without regard to sign (cols. 12 and 13).
Thus, reading the table line by line, one can
1These are early estimates which have probably
more in common with the data inputs used by the
forecasterthan the subsequently revisedfigures.
When the latter are used, which amounts to making
the forecaster responsible for estimating the future
revisions of the data, somewhat larger errors tend to
be obtained. The figures in line1are not intended
and should not be treated as a continuous annual
series, because they do not give effect to the histori-
cal revisions that render them comparable.
see how a forecaster has performed in any
year and compare his individual errors with
those of others and with the corresponding
averages. Reading down the columns, one can
compare the accuracy of different forecast
sources in any year and on the average over
time.2
In addition, the table presents the errors of
two simple types of extrapolation which pro-
vide common standards for screening the fore-
casts. The first (line 12) consists in
forward the last known (or estimated) value
of GNP: the level of the series next year is
assumed to be equal to that of this year. The
second, which is far more effective (line 13),
is an extrapolation of the past average chdnge
as it could have been computed from the post-
war record of GNP available up to the'ime
the forecast was made.
Table 11-4 illustrates a simple and effedtive
way of organizing basic data on forecasts.
Makers and users of forecasts can readily
adopt such a form to keep a running score of
their own or other people's predictive
and failures. It can suit a variety of needs by
application to forecasts of different variables
for different time units and periods, along
with other types of summary measures of
and benchmark extrapolations. We use
this "tableau" in the following sections to
discuss, first, the over-all record of the fbre-
casters as reflected in their average accuracy
in the periods covered, and, second, the short-
run variations in their performance.
I
The results shown in the tableau are based
on eight sets of forecasts which will be
throughout this report. The forecasts represent
a variety of sources and types. Four are
company forecasts which are typically
ucts of small professional teams (coded B, C,
F, and G). One comes from a small group of
forecasters from various industries, govern-
ment, and academic institutions(set A).
Another set (D) is from a group that presently
2Note, however, that not all of the averages in
cols. 12 and 13 relate to the same periods, which
impairs their comparability.
19includes about fifty business economists, for
which both summary measures and forecasts
by each individual participant were examined.
There is a median forecast (set E) based on
a poii of a large number of economists (pres-
ently about three hundred). Finally, there is
a set of averages compiled from an annual
summary of forecasts available since 1954
(set H). Altogether, the table records the
efforts of some three or four hundred economic
forecasters.3
4. SUMMARY MEASURES OF ERROR
AVERAGE ERRORS OF ANNUAL FORECASTS
AND EXTRAPOLATIONS
The errors in our collection of annual fore-
casts of GNP averaged nearly $10 billion dis-
•regarding sign (Table 11-4, line 11, col. 13).
They appear small—about 2 per cent—when
compared with the average level of GNP, but
they are big enough to make the difference
between a good and a bad business year. The
average year-to-year change in GNP over the
period 1953-63 amounted to about $22 billion
(line 12). Thus the errors were, in terms of
absolute averages, not quite one-half the size
of those errors that would be produced by
assuming that next year's GNP will be the
same as last year's.
Furthermore, the errors of these forecasts
were, on the whole, not much smaller than
those which would have resulted had the fore-
casters simply assumed that GNP would ad-
vance next year by the average amount it had
advanced in preceding years. The average
error on such an assumption would have been
nearly $12 billion (line 13). This exceeds the
corresponding figures for all but one forecast
set,butoftenbyratherslightmargins
(column
3Some forecasters may be in more than one group.
4An extrapolation of the average historical change
produces in effect good trend estimates for series that
tend to grow smoothly, such as postwar GNP. Such
extrapolations prove then to be a rather severe, if
simple, yardstick. They would be less adequate for
economic magnitudes that fluctuate more widely,
such as unemployment.
20
ERRORS OF LEVELS, CHANGES,
AND BASE VALUES
The simplest measure of error is obtained by
comparing the predicted and the actual levels,
but it is perhaps more important to compare
predicted and actual changes. The error in the
change will be the same as that in the level,
when the actual level at the time of the fore-
cast is known. As a rule, however, this is not
so and the two will differ by the amount of
error in the estimated current position, which
is the base of the forecast.
The errors in the estimated current position
are, of course, typically smaller than the errors
in forecasts proper, since the present is gen-
erally better known than the future. However,
they are by no means negligible. They average
about one-fourth or one-third of the corre-
sponding errors of the level forecasts for GNP,
and from 12 to 50 per cent for industrial
production.
For GNP, the errors of change forecasts
tend to be smaller than those of level forecasts.
The latter, as shown in Table 11-4, average
about $10 billion when taken without regard
to sign; the former average about $9 billion,
or 10 per cent less. For industrial production,
there is less regularity in the relation between
the level and the change forecasts because
errors of base and of level often differ in sign.
Chart 11-3 compares the actual year-to-year
changes in GNP and industrial production with
the changes forecast by one of the better, but
not unrepresentative, forecast records. Clearly
the pattern of predicted changes is broadly
similar to that of the actual changes. This is
true of each of the eight forecast sets exam-
ined here.5
5The significance of this relation will be better
appreciated when compared with the definitely in-
ferior results obtained for extrapolations. Thus the
use of the average historical change, as described
above, produces relatively good projections for GNP,
in terms of the over-all average errors, but predicted
change here is nearly constant from one year to the
next. Graphically, it would approximate a straight
line cutting through the "actual" GNP changes in
Chart 11-3 at the $20 billion level.Index of Industrial Production
Indes (1947-49 lOU) Index (1947-49=100)
Underneaththe paired curves for changes,
Chart 11-3 shows the discrepancies between
them, i.e., the errors of the change forecasts.
These are on the whole much smaller than the
corresponding changes themselves: as already
noted, the forecasts are typically better than
simpleextrapolationsoflast year'slevel,
which assume no change and therefore pro-
duce errors equal to the actual changes.
It should not be inferred from this chart that




effectively forecast a full year ahead. As noted
below, our records of quarterly forecasts sug-
gest that forecasters typically achieve a con-
siderable measure of success in forecastinthe
next one or two quarters, but limited su cess
beyond that. The annual record can likI wise
be interpreted as implying an effectiveore-
casting range of no more than two
Not only are the forecasts typically late
in the preceding calendar year, but a
of accuracy very similar to that shown here
could be attained merely by accurately
casting the first two quarters of the en uing
year and assuming no change beyond tha.
20 THEUNDERESTIMATION BIAS
The tendency of forecasters tounderestifnate
changes, which has been observed
is evident in most of our data. Thus the rhean
changes in actual values exceed those
dicted values for all but one of the forecast
sets examined; the actual changes in pNP
average about $22 billion and the
IC changes$19 billion.
5 Whenunderestimation applies to
inthe predicted series, then the future levels
of the series will also as a rule be
estimated.(This follows necessarily the
current position is known or itselfuijider-
stated.) On the other hand,
of decreases would tend to result in
estimation of levels. In series with
trends, such as GNP or industrial producjtion,
increases are more frequent than decreases, so
that the levels are understated most the
time. (Note that all but one of the av9rage
errors in Table 11-4, col. 12, are
However, in the GNP forecasts itpri-
marily the increases that were underestimated,
not the decreases. Recent recessions have been
sufficiently mild and short to cause only;very
small declines, or even merely of
growth, in the annual values of GNP. Accord-
ing to early estimates, declines occurrdd in
6H. Theil, EconomicForecastsand Policy,1 Am-




Actual and Predicted Changes and Errors,
Gross National Product and
Industrial Production, 1953-63
Actual change
————Predicted change, Forecast F
Error of predicted change, Forecast F
Gross National Product
















NOTE: Actual changes are based on first estimates
published by the source after the end of the forecast
year.1953-54 and On the former occa-
sion, most forecasts showed larger declines
than actually occurred; and on the latter, most
of them missed the downturn. In the years
when GNP increased, on the other hand,
underestimates were almost twice as frequent
as overestimates.Industrial production de-
clined much more in the recessions than did
GNP, and its contractions were in fact under-
estimated by most forecasters (though a few
greatly overestimated the drop in output in
1954).
If underestimation of changes was merely
the result of failure to forecast irregular or
random variations in the actual values, it would
not constitute an error or "bias" that fore-
casters could or should guard against. Fore-
casting errors that can be traced directly to
short random movements must be regarded as
unavoidable: a sudden outbreak of war or a
strike started without warning can hardly be
events that an economic forecaster should be
expected to predict (though his job certainly
does include an evaluation of the effects of
such events, once known, on the course of the
economy). To put it differently, in principle
the requirement of a good forecast is that it
predict well the systematic movements of the
given variable—not that it predict perfectly
the actual values of the latter. It could not do
that, except by accident, for economic series
where random elements are virtually always
present.
However, the observed underestimation is,
in fact, partly systematic. This is indicated by
the strong prevalence of negative signs among
the errors of predicted changes: the means of
the change forecasts are, with few exceptions,
smaller than the means of the actual changes.8
7Subsequent revisions reduced the decline of GNP
in1953-54 and convertedthe smalldeclinein
1957-58 into a very small increase.
8Smoothing out the irregular movements would
simply tendto make the variance of predicted
changes less than that of actual changes; averages of
predicted and of actual changes, taken with regard
to sign, should not be systematically different.
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Also, there is direct evidence that not only the
erratic changes but also the systematic cyclical
movements in comprehensive economic aggre-
gates are typically underestimated (see Table
11-5, below).
LARGER ERRORS OF LONGER-SPAN FORECASTS
Five of our forecast sets provide chains of pre-
dictions made at a given date for two or more
successive periods, e.g., for the first and second
half, or the four quarters, of the coming year.
These data have been used to analyze the per-
formance of forecasts over different intervals
between the current base and the future target
(which we call the span of the forecast).
The evidence shows clearly that the accuracy
of short-term forecasts diminishes as the span
increases. Both levels and changes are pre-
dicted better over the next three months than
over the next six, and better over six months
than over nine or twelve. Only a few examples
of this highly regular and pervasive relation
can be given here, but they are representative
and telling. In a semiannual forecast of GNP
for 1955-63 by a rather large group of business
economists, the mean absolute errors of change
are, for a six-month span, $6.7 billion; for a
twelve-month span, $12.3 billion. In a quar-
terly forecast by the staff of a large company
for the same years, the average errors, in bil-
lions of dollars, are for one quarter 5.0, for
two quarters 8.4, for three, four, five, and six
quarters 11.9, 13.7, 15.5, and 17.1, respec-
tively. Again, in a semiannual forecast of the
Federal Reserve Index of Industrial Production
for 1947-63, the mean absolute errors are 3.6
index points (1947-49=100) for six, and 7.1
points for twelve months. Similar progressions
in the size of errors appear also in forecasts of
other variables, such as the components of
GNP.
In general, extrapolations of various types
also tend to worsen with the lengthening of the
predictive span. Since many forecasters use
such extrapolative techniques, this is presum-
ably a part of the explanation for the observed
association between longer forecasts and larger
errors. Other ingredients of forecasts—van-ables that typically move in advance of the
predicted series, anticipations data, and the
forecaster's own judgment—also are probably
decreasingly reliable over longer spans, hence
contribution to the deterioration of the result-
ing forecast.
While the annual and shorter forecasts are
generally superior to extrapolations, those with
longer spans (say of twelve to eighteen months)
are often worse than the more effective types
of extrapolation, including projections of the
average historical change as used in Table 11-4.




It is often said that forecasters have their "off
years"—periods in which they generally go
wrong because of some difficulties inherent in
the type of economic change that occurred at
that time. In other periods, it is believed, no
such special difficulties exist, and forecasters
tend to be "right."
A year-by-year survey of forecasters' per-
formance will help appraise this view and its
implications. Our records show that the in-
creases in both GNP and industrial production
were underestimated most in the boom year
1955. Consequently, the level of economic
activity was also underestimated most in that
year (Table 11-4, line 10). Errors of the same
kind were made also in 1961, following the
latest recession, and in 1963, when the econ-
omy showed unexpected vigor after a retarda-
tion. On the other hand, in the recession years
1958 and 1960, the predicted levels of GNP
and industrial production were too high, either
because the changes were understated or be-
cause no declines were expected. The retarda-
tion of 1962 was widely missed, with the result
that the forecast levels were again too high.
Finally, the 1954 recession, as already noted,
turned out to be milder than many forecasters
apparently anticipated, particularly in terms of
GNP.
It should be noted that the timing of recent
business cycle downturns was early enough to
make the presence of the recession rather gen-
erally known by the end of the peak year (1953,
1957, and 1960). This, plus the presumption
that the contractions would continue to be
short, made the task of predicting annual
changes relatively easy.
Another fact, illustrated in Chart 11-3, is
the correspondence between the year-to-year
changes in the mean forecast errors of GNP
and in those of industrial production. The pat-
terns of changes have actually been quite simi-
lar in the two variables, and the forecasts we
have reviewed reflect this similarity.
FORECASTING AND BUSINESS CYCLES
The year-to-year comparisons of the preceding
section suggest that predictive errors are af-
fected by the cyclical characteristics of the fore-
cast period. Table 11-5, which utilizes forecasts
for quarters and half-years, demonstrates this
still more clearly. The levels of GNP and in-
dustrial production are underestimated most
in the first year of expansion, when the in-
creases in these series are very large. Later in
the expansion, when the increases are usually
smaller, the levels are underestimated much
less; and they may even be overestimated, as
happened in the "retardation" of 1962. In
contractions, overestimation of levels is the
rule, sometimes because the downturn is missed
and sometimes because the decline turns out to
be larger than predicted.
To understand how such results might come
about, it may be helpful to distinguish two pre-
dictive patterns, both of which would under-
estimate current cyclical changes, though in
very different ways. First, imagine a series of
forecasts which traces the fluctuations in the
actual series, but with a short lag. The ob-
served cyclical amplitudes need not be under-
estimated, but the current changes at certain
stages of the cycle will be. Second, imagine a
series of forecasts which faithfully reproduces
the trend, but not the cyclical movements, of
23TABLE 11-5
AVERAGE ERRORS IN FORECASTS OF GNP AND INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION DURING

















A—1948, 1955-63 GNP ($ billion)a —19.2 —4.4 +1.0
C—1958-62 GNP ($ billion)" —14.0 +2.9 +4.6
D—1947-62 Indus. prod. — 7.1 —4.4 +3.2
aF'orecast.s for the first and second half of the coming year.
bForecasts made quarterly for sequences of up to five quarters ahead.
CForecastsmade twice in the year for two or three semiannual periods ahead. The forecasts
for the eighteen-month spans cover the period from 1948 through the first half of 1956.
the actual values. The predictions simply cut
across the fluctuations, so that here both the
cyclical amplitudes and the current short-
period changes are underestimated.
Some forecasts look more like the lagging
cyclical model, others the trend-projection
model. In Chart 11-4, the former is illustrated
by forecast C, and the latter by forecast 0, for
GNP during 1958-61. Both these sets consist
of forecasts made for several quarters ahead,
which in the chart are linked together into
chains that fan out to the right from points
representing the forecasters' estimates of the
current position. The forecasts are made twice
or four times a year, and hence the chains
overlap. The C chains have "kinks" in 1958
and 1960-61, which lag the turning points in
GNP; the G chains show no kinks at all.
Forecasts of the trend-projection type, such
as G, come out rather well in terms of measures
of average errors, largely because they are rela-
tiVely optimistic and avoid the large under-
estimation bias of the "cyclical" forecasts. It
is clear, however, that forecasts such as these
24
must be regarded as failures with respect to
the recognition of turning points. The chain
forecasts with cyclical patterns can be more
useful in this role, even when they are tardy.
6. USES OF FORECAST
EVALUATIONS
The services that forecasts are expected to
render depend on the needs of the user and
are not easily defined by an outside observer.
Surely, however, the usefulness of a forecast is
in the first instance a function of its accuracy.
With the growth of public interest in the ex-
panding activity of economic forecasting, there
is increasing need for objective and compre-
hensive evaluations of forecasting accuracy—
a need as yet largely unsatisfied. Our study
will help to fill it by working out and applying
systematic methods of testing short-term eco-
nomic predictions.
Makers of forecasts, as well as users, have
a vital interest in a review of their record of
performance. Let me give two examples ofCHART 11-4
Two Sets of Chain Forecasts of GNP for 1958-61
and the Corresponding Actual Values
Billion dollars Billion dollars
NOTE: P and T represent business cycle peaks and
troughs, respectively.
simple improvements in forecasting methods
and results that have so far been suggested by
our study. First, we have found a great defi-
ciency in forecasters' records of the current
position at the time of forecast. These records
are essential to a proper appraisal. Second,
better utilization of the historical content of
the series is also needed. It seems desirable
that, at some stage, trend projections should be
incorporated in the forecasting process, since
our study shows that many forecasts looking
ahead four quarters or more are inferior to
simple trend extrapolations. As our work pro-
ceeds, we expect that advantages and dis-
advantages of different forecasting techniques
will come increasingly to the surface.
The general economist, finally, can benefit
from a study of the properties of forecasts,
since they throw light upon the formation and
revisions of economic expectations. With this
in mind, we are giving considerable attention
to forecasts of chains of short periods that par-
tially overlap in time, since such materials are
particularly informative here. Also, our study
reveals a large degree of interdependence,
though often a wide dispersion, among fore-
casts made at a particular time (cf. Table 11-4).
This has important implications for theories of
economic change.
VICTOR ZARNOWITZ
CONSUMER CREDIT MARKETS: A PROGRESS REPORT
The current consumer credit study reflects the
National Bureau's continued interest in this
segment of the credit market. Until the first
Studies in Consumer Instalment Financing
were published by the Bureau in the 1930's,
little was known about the nature and Opera-
tions of institutions serving the consumer's
credit needs, only scattered statistical esti-
mates measuring the volume of credit existed,
and little had been done to ascertain the risks
and costs inherent in consumer credit opera-
tions. Since the 1930's, consumer credit has
grown enormously in absolute and in relative
terms. The present study was designed to re-
examine some of the results of the earlier study
in the light of the additional experience and
statistical data available; to extend the research
into subjects, such as rates of charge, which
25had been treated sparingly if at all; and to
assess the significance of consumer credit de-
velopments in the changed economic circum-
stances of today.1
The work on the individual studies has
begun to produce tentative answers to various
questions.2 How rapidly have consumer credit
markets grown in importance to the national
economy? How do these markets function?
What rate and cost relations exist among the
institutions serving consumers? What is the
nature of the demand for consumer instalment
credit? Do consumers know the levels of rates
of charge and can they discern differences in
rates of charge? What kinds of credit informa-
tion are given consumers and what procedures
are necessary to make them comparable?
Where do the funds lent to consumers originate
and are these sources affected by changing
monetary conditions? Finally, does access to
consumer credit play a stabilizing or destabiliz-
ing role when unemployment occurs?
CONSUMER CREDIT AND THE
NATIONAL ECONOMY
F. Thomas Juster's preliminary findings on
trends in consumer investment and consumer
credit between 1897 and 1962 indicate that
instalment credit has become increasingly im-
portant to the national economy through its
contribution to the rapid growth of the stock
of capital owned by consumers—automobiles,
kitchen appliances, and so forth. Chart 11-5
shows the rapid rate of growth of two forms of
household (dwellings.and major durable
goods), and also indicates that both long-term
1The current study was made possible by grants
from four large sales finance companies. We have
benefited from the assistance of an advisory com-
mittee under the chairmanship of Paul W. McCrack-
en, University of Michigan.
2At the present time one book and four Occasional
Papers have been published, a second book and fifth
Occasional Paperareinpress,and four other
reports are in preparation. For a list of these reports
and further detail on the studies in progress, see
Part IV, section 4.
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mortgage debt and short-term instalment debt
grew even more rapidly. The implication is
clear that the household sector has increasingly
relied upon credit to finance a growing stock
of consumer capital.
Juster points out that gross additions to con-
sumer capital have been a rising fraction of
gross national product, while gross additions
to capital owned by business enterprise have
been a declining fraction (Chart 11-6). These
differential trends necessarily imply a shift in
the composition of gross fixed capital forma-
tion. In the decade from 1899 to 1908, his fig-
ures show, business enterprises accounted for
roughly two-thirds of gross fixed capital forma-
tion, households for about one-quarter, and
government for about one-tenth. By 1949-58,
the share of the enterprise sector had declined
to about 40 per cent of the total, the household
sector accounted for nearly one-half, and the
government share had risen to 15 per cent (ex-
cluding military capital expenditures). Gross
capital formation is now larger in the house-
hold than in the enterprise sector.3
The relative contribution of the household
and enterprise sectors to cyclical fluctuations
in capital goods output has changed as well.
From the turn of the century to the beginning
of the First World War, short-run variations
in the output of capital goods purchased by
business enterprises were four to five times as
great (in dollar magnitude) as those in con-
sumer capital formation. In the post-World
War II period, the variations in output of capi-
tal goods purchased by households were 50
per cent larger than the corresponding fluctua-
tions for the enterprise sector.
Marked changes in credit markets and finan-
cial institutions have accompanied these struc-
tural changes in the nature and composition of
capital formation. There has been an almost
uninterrupted liberalization of the credit terms
made available to consumer borrowers as the
market came to embrace larger and larger
segments of the population. Although the rates
31t does not necessarily follow that net capital
formation is also larger in the household sector.CHART 11-5
Major Types of Household Tangible Assets and Related Debt, 1897-1962
of charge on consumer debt have apparently
declined over the decades (see below), our
studies suggest that the change in credit terms,
rather than lower finance rates, was the more
important element in the rise in borrowing.
THE FUNCTIONING OF THE
AUTOMOBILE CREDIT MARKET
A large portion of our investigation of how
consumer credit markets function has been de-




Thomas Juster, "Trends in Consumer Investment and Consumer Credit, 1897-1962," NBER, inPer cent
CHART 11-6
Gross Investment by Households and Business Enterprises,1 897-1963
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of its importance and partly because data con-
cerning the price of credit, which we defined as
the finance rates, were more readily available
here. A first step was to construct estimates of
finance rates on automobile credit contracts.
Three large samples of sales finance company
contracts with reasonable geographic coverage
were used as benchmarks, covering 1935-38,
1954-55, and 1958-59. My portion of the work
was to construct time series estimates of finance
rates and to analyze factors affecting rate levels.
Wallace P. Mors, using the same data, has
studied the effects of state legal rate ceilings
upon finance rates.
We were surprised by the variation in new-
auto finance rates over time. Rates apparently
declined from levels approximating 15 per cent
in the 1920's to about 11 per cent in the early
1950's, then rose to about 12.5 per cent in
Since then, sales finance company new-
auto rates have declined more than a full per-
centage point, a greater decline that that ob-
4The finance rate series is presented in Part IV,
section 4.
28
servable in residential mortgage rates (Chart
11-7). The recent decline in finance rates and
mortgage rates in relation to other borrowing
rates may reflect the increased flows of funds
into savings accounts in commercial banks and
thrift institutions. This, along with other fac-
tors, appears to have increased rate competi-
tion among banks and sales finance companies
for automobile credit and lowered finance
rates.
The automobile credit market is patronized
by borrowers who either finance their obliga-
tions through dealers or obtain loans directly
from lending agencies. Commercial banks
make loansdirectlyand purchase paper
through dealers. As a result, three major types
of credit sources can be distinguished: sales
finance companies (which purchase dealer
paper), indirect financing banks, and direct
lending banks. The 1954-55 sample of credit
contracts provided us with an opportunity to
compare factors affecting rates among these
sources. The factors that appear to be most
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SOURCE: Finance rate series from Robert P. Shay, New-Automobile Finance Rates, 1924-62, New York,
NBER, 1963, Table 8, with minor revisions; mortgage rate series:1924-56, Saul B. Kiaman, The Postwar
Residential Mortgage Market, Princeton for NBER, 1961, Table A-6; 1954-62, FHA; 1963-64, new homes
only, HLBB in cooperation with FDIC, Federal Reserve Bulletin, February, 1965; and business loan rates for
1924-28 from Winfield W. Riefler, Money Rates and Money Markets in the United States, New York,
1930, and Federal Reserve Bulletins for the years thereafter.
NOTE: With the greater prevalence of second and third mortgages in the earlier years, home mortgage
borrowing costs probably declined over the period. All of the three series shown above reflect nominal rates
and are not adjusted for fees, product prices, and compensating balances. The 1939 data for business loan
rates are overlapped; the higher rateisa two-month average and the lower rate is a ten-month average
from the revised series.
are type of credit source, size of city, legal rate
ceiling, dealer's markup over factory price of
auto, purchase of credit life insurance, and
borrower's occupation. For the market as a
whole, it appears that elements of the credit
contract itself, legal restraints, and institutional
differences among credit sources are of primary
importance to rate levels.
Wallace Mors's study of the effects of legal
ceilings upon finance rates and the dealer's
share of the rate provides important additional
insights into the automobile credit market.
Mors finds, in his investigation of the 1958-59
sample of sales finance contracts for both new
and used automobiles, that consumer rates are
generally well below ceiling, indicating that
competitive forcesare operative. He also
finds that legal rate ceilings exert some influ-
ence upon the level of finance rates charged
borrowers.
Although these matters are still under study,

























1924 '30 '35 '40 '45
I I I I I I I I I I I Itions about the functioning of the automobile
credit market. First, active price competition
among sellers of credit has resulted in varia-
tions in finance rates over time and kept rates
well below legal ceilings. Second, the pairing
of buyers and sellers according to the price of
credit does not appear to be governed directly
by the creditworthiness of the individual bor-
rower, but rather by differentiating elements
in credit contracts, legal restraints, and general
institutional policies. On balance these factors
seem to result in a reasonable sorting of credit
customers according to risk, that is, in a man-
ner consistent with rate of charge.
INSTITUTIONAL COSTS OF
PROVIDING CREDIT
While the analysis of the automobile credit
market suggests that competition among sell-
ers of credit exercises a large influence upon
finance rates, the relation between income
and expenses among the institutions providing
credit also is indicative of the extent to which
consumers receive protection through the oper-
ation of competitive forces under existing legal
constraints. Paul F. Smith's book, Consumer
Credit Costs, 1949-59, revealed that the costs
of providing consumer credit are generally high
in comparison with other kinds of credit, and
that net profit rates are broadly comparable
with those in manufacturing industries.
Operating expenses among four types of
institutions studied (consumer finance com-
panies, sales finance companies, commercial
banks, and credit unions) were extremely wide,
ranging from $14.25 to $3.30 per hundred dol-
lars of outstanding credit in 1959. Many fac-
tors contribute to the level and to variations in
costs. The method of acquiring business, dif-
ferences in character of risks assumed, varia-
tions in size of credit contracts, legal controls
upon operating practices, and some implicit
costs inherent in credit union operations all
contributed to the wide range in recorded costs.
During 1949-59 the spread in average rates
among the four types of institutions declined,
a development that seems attributable both to
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competitive factors and to a narrowing of the
differences among the kinds of consumer loan
services provided to borrowers.
THE DEMAND FOR CONSUMER
INSTALMENT CREDIT
Even if rate competition exists and if profits
are at competitive levels, it does not necessarily
follow that credit markets function perfectly.
In Consumer Sensitivity to Finance Rates,
F. Thomas Juster and I undertook an experi-
mental questionnaire sampling of Consumers
Union subscribers to test the hypothesis that
the market for consumer instalment credit is
imperfect—in the sense that the bulk of con-
sumer borrowers are "rationed" with respect
to the amounts of credit they can obtain at
going rates of charge. Because of institutional
limits upon rates, down payments, maturities,
and loan sizes, we believe that most consumers
accumulate more equity than they desire when
purchasing durable goods instalment credit. As
a result, they are insensitive to finance rates
because they value equity funds more than the
marginal costs of borrowing in the market.
Borrowers in these circumstances are strongly
impelled to obtain the largest amount of credit
available—usually associated with the longest
maturity and lowest monthly payment.
Our data are consistent with the hypothesis
that there are substantial differences in rate
elasticity between groups of borrowers classed
as "rationed" and "unrationed." The former
group included younger married families and
those with small liquid asset holdings and a
relatively favorable attitude toward credit use.
The rate elasticity of this group was virtually
nil. On the other hand, in the unrationed group
—older married families or single persons with
higher incomes and liquid assets, and those
with an unfavorable attitude toward credit use
—rate elasticity was considerably higher. Since
the majority of consumer borrowers probably
fall in the rationed category, our results sug-
gestthatlittleratesensitivitywould be
observable in the population as a whole.In this same work, Juster and I attempted
to ascertain the extent of consumer knowledge
of finance rates actually paid on recently fi-
nanced durable goods purchases. The majority
of borrowers, some 82 per cent, were unable
to give rates estimates of reasonable accuracy.
Yet respondents did seem to know that certain
types of credit were more expensive than
others. They knew, for example, that auto-
mobile loans were less costly than furniture
loans and that small loans were more expensive
than large loans. We termed this "institutional"
knowledge because other research has sug-
gested that borrowers may draw such broad
distinctions by associating high and low rates
with particular types of institutions.
RATE INFORMATION
AND QUOTATION
Wallace P. Mors's book, Consumer Credit
Finance Charges: Rate In formation and Quota-
tion, now in press, traces the origins and de-
velopment of the various forms in which con-
sumers receive finance charge information,
reviews the procedures they must follow to
make comparisons among credit alternatives,
and evaluates the extent to which the variety
of information given can be used by consumers
to make effective comparisons of credit cost.
Mors's major conclusionisthat no single
method of quoting charges, whether in dollars
or rates of charge, is a reliable guide to credit
cost, taken by itself. Among the several forms
of information—monthly payment size, effec-
tive monthly or annual rates, add-on or dis-
count rates on the amount borrowed—each
may serve as a useful guide to credit cost in
certain situations but have little value in others.
Mors notes problems confronting consumers
in using the varied information effectively and
concludes that the diversity of state legislation
contributes to the lack of uniformity encoun-
tered among the systems used to compute and
quote charges.
In this connection it is of interest to note
that the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws has established a proj-
ect for the purpose of drafting comprehensive
uniform or model state legislation to govern
consumer credit. Members of their staff have
shown considerable interest in our reports and
have stated that they have found them useful
for their purposes.
SOURCES OF FUNDS FOR
CONSUMER CREDIT
Richard T. Selden, in Occasional Paper 85,
Trends and Cycles in the Commercial Paper
Market, explored the rapid resurgence of this
market in the postwar period. He found that
the demand for commercial paper funds was
determined by the amount of receivables which
finance companies could acquire profitably and
by the relative cost of commerical paper and
bank loans. The supply of funds appeared to
be quite elastic with respect to the differential
between paper yields and Treasury-bill yields.
Both demand and supply were sensitive to
cyclical conditions. The divergent cyclical be-
havior of the volume of directly placed paper
compared with that of dealer paper—the for-
mer rising and falling with the business cycle
and the latter showing countercyclical move-
ments—is a major finding which Selden ex-
plains in terms of differential demand and
supply hypotheses. Selden's remaining work on




In an Occasional Paper now in press, Philip A.
Klein analyzes the financial adjustments to un-
employment made by families receiving un-
employment compensation, in order to deter-
mine how and to what extent consumer credit
affects these adjustments. Working with ques-
tionnaires originated by the Department of
Labor in six field surveys between 1954 and
1958, the study ascertains the manner in which
these families were able to adjust to the loss
of income when unemployment occurred. Un-
employment compensation wasthe major
source of funds to offset the decline in income,
reducing the gross loss in family earnings by
3132 per cent. To offset the drop in family income
net of unemployment compensation, families
reduced their net worth to the extent of 34 per
cent of the income decline and reduced con-
sumption expenditures the remaining 66 per
cent. Reductions in liquid asset holdings ac-
counted for two-thirds of the net worth reduc-
tion, and debt adjustments accounted for the
remaining third. Debt adjustments took the
form of borrowing from friends, relatives, or
financial institutions, running up unpaid bills,
or allowing delinquencies and repossessions to
occur on instalment obligations. While impair-
ment of net worth has long-run consequences
for those who suffer unemployment, Klein
points out that in the short run it does permit a
less drastic cut in consumption expenditures
and cushions the aggregate effects of unemploy-
ment upon the rest of the economy. Klein also
found that the longer unemployment lasted, the
greater was the reduction in consumption ex-
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penditures, since resources get used up and
other adjustments in net worth become more
difficult to make. He concludes that unemploy-
ment compensation, the liquidation of assets,
and adjustments in debt position all acted as
stabilizing influences, although unemployment
compensation has far greater quantitative im-
portance and has the advantage of not impair-
ing the net worth of unemployed families.
SUMMARY REPORT
A summary report on the study's major find-
ings is being prepared. It will review trends
and cycles in credit; compare the relative im-
portance of the several institutions supplying
credit; discuss the effects of changes in rates,
terms, and sources of funds; and, finally, assess
the contribution of consumer instalment credit
to the nation's economic performance.
ROBERT P. SHAY